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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a public credit registry on the repayment be-
havior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan
repayment is not third-party enforceable. We compare market outcome with a
credit registry to that without a credit registry. This experiment is conducted for
two market environments: !rst a market in which interactions between borrowers
and lenders are one-o! and, second, a market in which borrowers and lenders can
choose to trade repeatedly with each other. In the market with one-o! interactions
the credit market collapses without a credit registry as lenders rightly fear that bor-
rowers will default. The introduction of a registry in this environment signi!cantly
raises repayment rates and the credit volume extended by lenders. In the market
where repeat transactions are possible a credit registry is not necessary to sustain
high market performance. In such an environment relationship banking enforces
repayment even when lenders cannot share information, so that there is little value
added of a public credit registry.
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1 Introduction
In credit markets borrowers typically have more information about their investment
opportunities, their own character and their prior indebtedness than lenders. This
asymmetry of information gives rise to selection problems for lenders and potential
moral hazard of borrowers, which may lead to a rationing of credit (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). In many countries problems of assymetric information are aggravated
by the fact that loan contracts are costly to enforce.
One response to asymmetric information and costly enforcement is information
sharing between lenders. Recent surveys show that information sharing institutions
such as private credit bureaus and public credit registries exist in a wide range of
countries (Miller, 2003). Cross country studies suggest that these institutions do
enhance the performance of the !nancial sector. Japelli and Pagano (2002) and
Djankov et al. (2005) show that bank credit to the private sector is higher in
countries where information sharing is more developed. Analyzing !rm-level survey
data Galindo and Miller (2001) and Love and Mylenko (2003) show that access to
bank credit is easier in countries where credit bureaus or registries exist.
How do credit bureaus and registries enhance the performance of credit markets?
Theoretical models suggest that information sharing can reduce selection costs for
lenders in markets where borrowers approach di!erent lenders sequentially (Japelli
and Pagano, 1993). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that private credit bureaus do
reduce the selection costs of lenders by accurately predicting loan defaults (Kallberg
and Udell, 2003; Barron and Staaten, 2003).
Information sharing can also have a strong disciplining e!ect on borrowers. Di-
amond (1989) shows that a public credit registry can motivate borrowers to choose
agreed projects. Further models show that information sharing can discipline bor-
rowers into exerting high e!ort in projects (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano,
2000) and repaying loans (Klein, 1992). So far, empirical studies have not been able
to con!rm the disciplining e!ect of information sharing institutions1. This is not
at all surprising, seeing that is di"cult to identify whether a borrower has exerted
more e!ort in repaying a loan than he would have done without the presence of a
credit registry.
The objective of this paper is to provide direct evidence that a public credit
registry can discipline borrowers into repaying loans. To this end we take an ex-
1Japelli and Pagano (2002) show that loan defaults, measured by country risk indicators, are
lower in countries where credit registries and bureaus are mode developed. However, this result
can obviously result from better selection of borrowers rather from actual disciplining of them to
repay.
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perimental approach. Experimental studies have proven highly valuable in testing
theoretical conjectures which cannot be isolated using !eld data. In !nancial mar-
kets, experiments have, for example, been used to study the emergence of bubbles
(Smith et. al, 1988; Lei et. al., 2001 ), the dissemination of information (Sunder,
1992), herd behavior (Celan and Kariv, 2004), and more recently the emergence
of banking relationships (Fehr and Zehnder, 2005). We examine an experimental
credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable. We !rst im-
plement a market in which there is no opportunity for information sharing between
lenders. We then implement an identical market, but with a public credit registry
which collects and disburses credit information to lenders. By comparing repayment
behavior and credit volumes between the two markets we can identify the impact
of a credit registry on credit market performance.
The impact of a credit registry on repayment behavior may depend strongly on
the nature of the credit market. In particular, the extent to which lending is a
one-o! or a repeated transaction may a!ect the potential bene!ts of information
sharing between lenders. In a credit market dominated by one-o! transactions (e.g.
trade credit for rare purchases), borrowers cannot be disciplined to repay loans in
the absence of an information sharing mechanism. In contrast in credit markets
with repeated interactions (e.g. working capital loans) theoretical models suggest
that information sharing may not be required to discipline borrowers. In such mar-
kets self-enforcing implicit contracts between lenders and borrowers, i.e. banking
relationships, can motivate high e!ort and timely repayments (Bull, 1987; Boot and
Thakor, 1994). Empirical studies show indeed that some credit market segments (in
particular small business lending) are pervaded by relationship-banking and that
these relationships improve the access of potential borrowers to credit (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994, Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Experimental studies (Brown et al., 2004;
Fehr and Zehnder, 2005) also con!rm that long-term relationships are a powerful
disciplinary device.
In this paper we examine how the impact of a credit registry depends on the
nature of credit transactions. We implement our experimental credit market in two
environments. In one environment information conditions imply that all lending
transactions are inherently one-o!. In the second environment information condi-
tions are such that borrowers can choose to trade with the same lender repeatedly
and banking relationships can emerge.
Our results indicate that the impact of a credit registry on market performance
is highly dependent on the nature of credit transactions. When the credit market
is characterized by one-o! transactions the absence of a credit registry causes the
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market to essentially break-down. As repayments are not third-party enforceable
many borrowers default and lenders cannot pro!tably o!er credit contracts. The in-
troduction of a credit registry in this environment greatly enhances the performance
of the credit market. The availability of information on past repayment behavior
allows lenders to condition their o!ers on the borrowers’ reputation. As borrowers
with a good track record get better credit o!ers, all borrowers have a strong in-
centive to sustain their reputation by repaying their debt. As a consequence a well
functioning credit market is established in which a large percentage of the available
gains from trade is realized.
When repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders is possible the pres-
ence of a credit registry has no such e!ect on market performance. In this environ-
ment the market participants solve the moral hazard problem even in the absence
of a credit registry. By repeatedly interacting with the same borrower, lenders es-
tablish long-term relationships which enable them to condition their credit terms
on the past repayments of their incumbent borrower. As only a good reputation
leads to attractive credit o!ers from the incumbent lender borrowers have strong
incentives to repay. The disciplining e!ect of these banking relationships is strong
enough such that the introduction of a credit registry only slightly improves credit
market performance.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Part 2 presents our experimental design and
part 3 the corresponding predictions. Part 4 presents our results. Part 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Our experimental credit market involves 17 participants. These participants are
randomly assigned to the role of a borrower or a lender at the beginning of a
session. Ten subjects are in the role of lenders and seven subjects are in the role of
borrowers. Each session lasts for 20 periods and roles of subjects are !xed for the
whole session.
We implement two di!erent credit market environments: The !rst environment
involves a market in which particular lenders and borrowers interact only in a one-o!
situation. We implement transactions with a one-o! nature by randomly assigning
identi!cation numbers (ID’s) to borrowers and lenders in each new period (hence-
forth treatments in this environment are called R- treatments). This procedure
guarantees that no market participant can identify his former trading partners at
the beginning of a period and therefore intentional repeated interactions of lenders
and borrowers are ruled out. This environment captures a credit market in which,
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for example, borrowers are highly mobile, or they seek trade credit for rare pur-
chases.
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Random ID Fixed ID
yes R-CR F-CR
no R-NO F-NO
C
re
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Market Environment
Our second environment involves a market in which lenders and borrowers have
the opportunity to engage in long-term relationships. Repeated interactions with
the same trading partner are possible because subjects have !xed ID’s for the entire
experimental session (henceforth treatments in this environment are called F- treat-
ments). Consequently, lenders can o!er credit to the same borrower (i.e., to the
same ID number) in consecutive periods and, if the borrower accepts these o!ers, a
long-term relationship is established. This environment captures a credit market in
which particular lenders and borrowers typically trade repeatedly with each other
(working capital loans, credit card loans).
Table 1 provides an overview of our experimental treatments. In order to study
the impact of a credit registry on credit market performance we conduct two treat-
ments in each environment: one treatment with a credit registry (CR treatment)
and one treatment without (NO treatment). This gives us a total of four treatments.
In all four treatments we implement the same credit market. At the beginning
of every period each lender is endowed with 50 capital units (!!). A lender has two
opportunities to make use of his endowment. He can either invest the endowment
in an endowment-storing technology or he can use the endowment to extend credit
to a borrower. The !rst stage of each period is a continuous one-sided auction, in
which lenders and borrowers can seal credit contracts. The lenders are the contract
makers, i.e. they alone can make credit o!ers to the borrowers, who themselves
can not apply for credit. When making a credit o!er the lender has to specify
four items: the size of the loan (!), the requested repayment "#"$, who can observe
the o!er and !nally, which borrowers are authorized to accept the o!er. Lenders
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can freely decide how they want to split their endowment between the endowment-
storing technology and a credit o!er, i.e. the loan size ! can be picked from the set
{5, 10, 15, ..., 50}. The set for the requested repayment #" is given by {5, 10, 15, ...,
100}. There are two types of credit o!ers: Public credit o!ers and private credit
o!ers. A private credit o!er is only addressed to one speci!c borrower. It cannot
be seen or accepted by other borrowers and is also not visible to other lenders. A
public o!er is always shown to all borrowers and all other lenders. However, even
with public o!ers the lender must specify which borrowers are authorized to accept
the o!er. Hereby the lender can choose, or exclude as many borrowers as he wants.2
During the auction a lender can make as many public and private o!ers as he wants.
However, each lender can only conclude one credit contract per period. As soon as
a borrower accepts an o!er of a certain lender a contract is concluded and all other
outstanding o!ers of this lender disappear from the market and can no longer be
accepted by other borrowers. Each borrower can accept at most one contract per
period so that our credit market implements an excess supply of credit.
Borrowers are endowed with 5 capital units in each period. At the second stage
of a period borrowers automatically yield an investment income which is twice the
size of this endowment and their borrowed capital, %"& ' !$. At the third stage
of a period, borrowers who received a loan decide whether they want to make the
repayment requested by the lender (" ( #") or not repay at all (" ( )). Partial
repayments are not possible.3
Finally, each lender is informed about his borrower’s repayment decision, pro!ts
are calculated and all market participants get to know their own and their partner’s
payo!s for the period. Payo! functions, the number of lenders and borrowers and
the number of trading periods are common knowledge. The monetary payo!s of
the market participants are calculated as follows:
Payo! of lender: # ( &)! ! ' "
Payo! of borrower: $ ( %"& ' !$! "
In the treatments with a credit registry (R-CR and F-CR) all lenders get a credit
report at the beginning of every period. The credit report is free and lists for each
borrower and all past periods whether the borrower received a loan and whether
he repaid it. The report thus contains complete information on the past repay-
ment behavior of all borrowers. However, information on loan sizes and requested
2This implementation of public o!ers intends to capture public anouncements of credit condi-
tions by banks who can always choose not to extend credit to some clients on these terms.
3In reality some borrowers obviously become delinquent without fully defaulting. However due
to the deterministic nature of investment earnings in our design we exclude partial repayments.
5
repayments is not provided. All borrowers and lenders are aware that the credit
registry automatically collects and disburses information on repayment behavior in
each period.
To make sure that all participants fully understand the decision process and the
payment structure of the game, each subject has to read a detailed set of instructions
before a session is started. After reading the instructions participants have to pass
a test with control questions. No session starts before all subjects have correctly
answered all control questions. Additionally there are two practice periods before an
actual session is started in order to make the participants familiar with the bidding
procedures. In both practice periods subjects only go through the o!ering stage of
a period, i.e. there are no repayment choices and subjects cannot earn money in
the practice periods.
In total we conducted 20 experimental sessions, !ve for each of our four treat-
ments. We had 17 subjects in each session, which makes a total of 340 participants.
All experimental subjects were volunteers. They were all participating for the !rst
time in such an experiment, and each participant could only participate in one ses-
sion (i.e., each subject experienced only one of the treatments). All participants
were students of the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of Technol-
ogy Zurich (ETH). The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted
with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). A session lasted ap-
proximately ninety minutes and subjects earned on average 55 Swiss Francs (1.2
CHF " 1 US$ in January 2005).
3 Predictions
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and sel!shness of all
market participants the prediction for all four treatments is straight forward: Since
credit repayments are not enforceable, the borrowers’ best reply in the stage game is
to never repay their debt. Lenders, anticipating this behavior, will never o!er credit
so that the credit market collapses in the stage game equilibrium. As our experiment
lasts for a !nite number of periods a simple backward induction argument ensures
that the stage game equilibrium is played in every period of the game. The di!erent
treatment conditions do not a!ect this prediction. If lenders are certain that all
borrowers are sel!sh, neither public information on past repayment behavior of
borrowers nor the possibility to establish long-term relationships can overcome this
ine"cient outcome.
However, empirical evidences suggests that not all people simply maximize mon-
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etary payo!s. It has been shown that in a wide range of economic settings some
people are also motivated by social motives (for an overview see, e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt (2002) and Camerer (2003)). Recent research by Giuso et al. (2004) sug-
gests that social concerns may also be important in the context of !nancial markets.
In our experiment social motives could lead some borrowers to repay loans because
they would otherwise su!er from a bad conscience or because they would like to
reciprocate "fair" !nancing conditions provided by lenders. In the following we
therefore examine predictions for our treatments under the assumption that a frac-
tion % of the borrowers are "conditionally honest". We assume that these borrowers
are willing to meet their repayment obligations (" ( #") on a voluntary basis as
long as the repayment requested by the lender does not exceed a certain threshold
value #""!$ # !""!$ ( &!, whereby & ' * (this implies that an honest borrower is
prepared to repay a loan which demands some positive interest rate). Guided by
existing experimental evidence (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 2002) we also assume
that honest borrowers only repay if they get at least an equal share of gains from
trade, i.e. %!-!""!$ $ !""!$! ! or & # *(&( These considerations lead us therefore to
assume a parameter range of & % "*) *(&+ (
3.1 Predictions for the R- Treatments
In the R-NO treatment lenders have no information on the prior behavior of any
particular borrower in the market. This treatment essentially implements a series of
one-shot interactions so that each period can be analysed as a one-period game. In
such a game sel!sh borrowers never repay their debt while honest borrowers repay
as long as they are o!ered a contract of the form ,!) #" # &!+. Proposition 1 shows
that under these conditions lenders are only willing to o!er credit if the fraction of
honest borrowers % is large enough.
Proposition 1: If % $ 1
!
there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
all borrowers receive maximum credit of &). If, however, % * 1
!
the credit market
collapses.
(Proof: see Proposition A1 in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 suggests that a substantial share of honest borrowers are required
to guarantee the existence of a functioning credit market. We assumed above that
& % "*) *(&+ ( In this case the necessary fraction of honest borrowers to make credit
o!ers pro!table for lenders is % $ %+-. Experimental evidence suggests, however,
that only 40 to 60 percent of subjects are motivated by social preferences (see e.g.
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Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). We therefore predict that the credit market will collapse
in our R-NO treatment. Empirically, however, a full collapse of the market would
require that all lenders have an accurate initial belief about the fraction of honest
borrowers. This is a relatively strong assumption. If some lenders start with too
high beliefs, there may be some trading in the early periods. However, as soon as
learning takes place and beliefs are updated the credit market should break down.
In the R-CR treatment lenders receive a credit report at the beginning of
each period stating the repayment behavior of each borrower in all prior periods.
In contrast to the R-NO treatment, lenders in the R-CR can therefore condition
their credit o!ers on the past repayment behavior of borrowers. This means, for
example, that lenders can decide to only o!er credit to those borrowers who have
always repaid their debt in all past periods. If sel!sh borrowers anticipate this
behavior of lenders they have a strong incentive to hide their type and imitate the
behavior of honest borrowers. Repaying a loan is the only way for sel!sh borrowers
to build up a reputation as a honest type and to get access to pro!table future
credit o!ers of lenders. Similar to Kreps et al. (1982) Proposition 2 shows that this
mechanism allows us to sustain an equilibrium with a substantial credit volume,
even if the share of honest borrowers % is such that the credit market collapses in
the R-NO treatment.
Proposition 2: Suppose that % * 1
!
so that the market collapses in the R-NO
treatment. In the R-CR treatment a perfect bayesian equilibrium exists with the
following characteristics:
(i) in all periods , * %) ! - each borrower receives a contract ,!) #"+ ( ,!!) !!+ and
repays "!"!!$ ( !! with certainty, whereby - is the smallest integer that satis!es
% $ 1
!!+1
.
(ii) in all periods %)! - # , * %) each borrower who did not default in any prior
period receives a contract ,!) #"+ ( ,!!) &!!$+ with probability .!" % ")) *$( Sel!sh
borrowers repay with probability /!" % ")) *$ and honest borrowers repay with
certainty.
(iii) in period t=20 each borrower who did not default in any prior period receives
a contract ,!) #"+ ( ,!!) &!!$+ with probability .!20 % ")) *$. Sel!sh borrowers
default, while honest borrowers repay with certainty.
(Proof: see Proposition A2 in the Appendix).
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Proposition 2 suggests that in early periods of the R-CR treatment full credit will
be provided and all sel!sh borrowers will repay loans out of reputational concerns.
In later periods reputational incentives decline and repayment rates fall as sel!sh
borrowers begin to default. The aggregate credit volume also falls as those borrowers
who defaulted in prior periods receive no further loans and those who repaid receive
loans only with a probability less than 1.
Consider the case of & ( *(% (honest borrowers are willing to repay 60 if they
receive a loan of size 50) and % ( )(& (1
2
of borrowers are honest). In this case Propo-
sition 1 shows that the credit market collapses in the R-NO treatment. Proposition
2 tells us that in the R-CR treatment all borrowers could get full credit provision
until period 16 and from then on they still get maximum credit with a positive
probability. This implies that the credit registry can have a signi!cant positive
e!ect on credit market e"ciency. Propositions 1 and 2 therefore lead us to the
following hypotheses for our R- treatments:
Hypothesis R-Treatments: In the R-CR treatment the repayment rate of bor-
rowers is signi!cantly higher than in the R-NO treatment. In the R-NO treatment
the low repayment rate leads to a collapse of the credit market. In the R-CR
treatment credit volumes are signi!cantly higher than in the R-NO, albeit with
decreasing volumes towards the end of the experiment.
3.2 Predictions for the F- Treatments
In the F-NO treatment lenders do not have information on the behavior of all bor-
rowers in all prior periods. However, lenders do have information on past behavior
of those borrowers with whom they themselves have traded in prior periods. Thus
in contrast to the R-NO treatment lenders have the possibility to engage in a long-
term relationship with a speci!c borrower. By conditioning their future o!ers on
the past repayment behavior of a borrower, they can motivate repayments, because
repaying rather than defaulting may provide future bene!ts for sel!sh borrowers.
However, given that there are more lenders than borrowers in the market, estab-
lishing a relationship is anything but trivial. The problem is that a borrower always
has the possibility to default on one lender and then switch to another lender who
is not informed about his past behavior. In order to prevent borrowers from switch-
ing lenders, incumbent lenders must make o!ers which "outside" lenders cannot
compete with. This requires that relationships generate superior information for
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incumbent lenders on a borrower’s type. Proposition 3 shows that equilibria exist
in which this is the case:
Proposition 3: Suppose that % * 1
!
so that the market collapses in the R-NO
treatment. In the F-NO treatment there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
the following characteristics:
(i) in period 1 all lenders o!er a contract of the form ,!!) #"!1 %
¡
!!) &!!
¢
+. Sel!sh
borrowers accept a contract and repay with probability .!1 % ")) *$, while
honest borrowers accept a contract and repay with certainty.
(ii) in all periods % # , * %) lenders who were repaid in the previous period ,! *
o!er a contract ,!!) !!+ with probability .!" % ")) *$ to their incumbent borrower
and all borrowers who get a contract repay with certainty. Lenders who were
not repaid in the prior period and "outside lenders" o!er no credit.
(iii) in period 20 lenders who were repaid in period 19 o!er a contract ,!!) #"!20 %¡
!!) &!!
¢
+ with probability .!" % ")) *$ to their incumbent borrower. Sel!sh
borrowers never repay while honest borrowers repay with certainty. Lenders
who were not repaid in the prior period and "outside lenders" o!er no credit.
(Proof: see Proposition A3 in the Appendix).
Proposition 3 shows that in a market with potential repeat transactions but no
credit registry not all borrowers can repay loans in the !rst period. If this were
the case incumbent lenders would have the same information as outside lenders
and thus could not motivate repayment by promising better future contracts. As
some sel!sh borrowers default in period 1 incumbent lenders know that those who
repaid are honest with a probability exceeding %. This allows them to pro!tably
o!er credit in all periods , ' * while outside lenders cannot. As incumbent lenders
promise better credit access than outside lenders sel!sh borrowers are motivated to
repay their loans.
In the F-CR treatment the credit registry provides lenders with information
on past repayment behavior of all borrowers. Given these information conditions we
can again apply Proposition 2 which describes equilibria for the R-CR treatment4.
4Note that in the F-CR treatment lenders actually have more information than in the R-CR
treatment. For their own past borrowers they know not only whether a borrower repaid, as is
stated in the credit registry, but also the corresponding contract terms. However, this additional
information obviously does not mean that the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 (which only
requires credit registry information) no longer applies also in the F-CR treatment.
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As discussed above this proposition shows that lenders condition their credit of-
fers on the credit record of a borrower. In initial periods this motivates all sel!sh
borrowers to repay and makes it pro!table for lenders to extend maximum credit
volumes. In contrast to the F-NO treatment incumbent lenders do not need superior
information to motivate borrowers in the F-CR treatment. This is the case because
the credit registry prevents borrowers from "escaping" to another lender after de-
faulting. Thus, in the F-CR treatment full repayment of all borrowers is possible in
initial periods while in the F-NO partial defaulting is necessary to generate superior
information for incumbent lenders. This implies higher aggregate credit volumes in
the F-CR than in the F-NO treatment as all borrowers receive credit contracts in
initial periods of the F-CR, while in the F-NO the mixed strategy of lenders implies
that borrowers are subsequently excluded from the credit market. This leads to our
hypothesis for the F- treatments:
Hypothesis F- Treatments: In the F-CR treatment the aggregate repayment
rate is slightly higher than in the F-NO treatment because defaulting is disciplined
by all lenders. In the F-CR treatment the aggregate credit volume is also slightly
higher than in the F-NO treatment.
4 Results
We present our results in two sections. Section 4.1 analyses our R- treatments and
thus examines the impact of a credit registry in a market with one-o! transactions.
Section 4.2 analyses our F- treatments and thus looks at the impact of a credit
registry in a market where repeat transactions are possible.
4.1 Results for the R-Treatments
In this section we examine the impact of a credit registry in a market with one-o!
transactions by comparing the outcome of the R-CR to that of the R-NO treatment.
We begin by examining the repayment behavior of borrowers. Figure 1 presents the
repayment rate of borrowers by period for both treatments.
Our predictions suggest that in the R-NO treatment sel!sh borrowers will default
while honest borrowers repay loans with fair terms. Figure 1 shows that loan
repayment in the R-NO treatment is actually very low. The repayment rate hovers
around 30% throughout the experiment, resulting in a total repayment rate of 29%.
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Figure 1: Repayment Rates in R- Treatments
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As predicted the repayment rate in the R-CR treatment is substantially higher.
In this treatment the aggregate repayment rate is 80 % and thus more than twice
that of the R-NO treatment. A non-parametric test con!rms that the di!erence in
repayment rates between the R-CR and R-NO treatments is statistically signi!cant.
We conduct a Mann-Whitney Test using average repayment rates per session as
observations. The 5 sessions of the R-CR treatment display repayment rates of
87, 85, 81, 77 and 70 percent respectively. Every session of the R-CR treatment
has a higher repayment rate than any session in the R-NO treatment. In that
treatment the !ve sessions have repayment rates of 39, 31, 29, 26 and 16 percent
respectively. A one-sided test thus con!rms that repayment is more frequent in the
R-CR treatment "% ( ()).$.
Figure 1 suggests that a credit registry prevents potential loan defaults in one-
o! transactions because sel!sh borrowers are aware that their current repayment
behavior may a!ect their future access to credit. This interpretation is supported
by fact that the repayment of loans in the R-CR treatment falls over time. Our
predictions suggest that the value of a good reputation declines towards the end
of our experiment, due to the !nite horizon of 20 periods. We therefore expect
that sel!sh borrowers who repay in earlier periods out of reputational concerns,
will default in the !nal periods. Indeed the !gure shows that in the !nal periods of
the R-CR treatment loan repayments decrease steadily. While 86% of all loans are
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repaid in period 1 through 15 this falls to less than 50% in the last !ve periods of
the R-CR treatment. Moreover, as predcited the repayment rate in the !nal period
of the R-CR treatment falls to that of the R-NO treatment.
Figure 1 strongly suggests that a credit registry motivates loan repayments from
sel!sh borrowers in one-o! transactions, when they would otherwise default. How-
ever, an alternative explanation for our !nding could be that sel!sh borrowers de-
fault in both treatments while honest borrowers repay more often in the R-CR than
in the R-NO treatment. We would predict such behavior if better contract terms
were o!ered in the R-CR than in the R-NO treatment so that honest borrowers
have more scruples to default. In order to control for such di!erences in contract
terms we conduct a multivariate analysis of repayment behavior.
Table 2 reports a probit analysis of repayment decisions in the R-CR and R-
NO treatments. Note that in our experiment borrowers could only choose to make
the desired repayment in full or default. Our dependant variable is therefore a
dummy variable which is 1 if a borrower repaid and 0 if he defaulted. We pool all
observations from the R-CR and R-NO treatment. Our main explanatory variable
is the dummy variable "R-CR" which is 1 for all observations in the R-CR treatment
and 0 for all those in the R-NO treatment. If repayment rates are higher ceteris
paribus we should see a positive coe"cient on this variable.
We control for the size of loans and the desired repayment by including the
variables "CreditSize" and "RepaymentSize". If honest borrowers reciprocate better
contract terms with higher repayment probabilities we expect a positive coe"cient
for "CreditSize" and a negative coe!cient for "RepaymentSize". This prediction
applies to both treatments. The regression also includes the interaction variables
"R-CR*CreditSize" and "R-CR*RepaymentSize". These variables should capture
the additional incentive e!ects of high loans and low repayment demands on sel!sh
borrowers in the R-CR treatment. Our predictions suggest that sel!sh borrowers
will be more likely to repay if their expected future rents from a good reputation
and the cost of current repayment is low. Our data does not allow us to capture the
expectations of borrowers concerning future rents. However, we suggest that the
size of a borrowers current loan is a good indicator for potential loans in the future.
Thus "R-CR*CreditSize" is a measure for the impact of expected rents on sel!sh
borrowers repayment in the R-CR treatment and we expect a positive coe"cient.
The cost of repaying a loan to the borrower is the repayment requested by the
lender in the current period. The variable "R-CR*RepaymentSize" captures the
potential e!ect of higher repayment demands on sel!sh borrowers’ repayments in
the R-CR and should be negative. Our !nal explanatory variables are the dummy
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variable "FinalPeriods" and the interaction term "SCR*FinalPeriods". The variable
"FinalPeriods" takes on the value 1 if the decision was made in period 16 or later
and 0 for earlier periods. We expect no time e!ects on repayment in the R-NO
treatment and therefore that "FinalPeriods" should be insigni!cant. However, as
the disciplining e!ect of a credit registry on sel!sh borrowers declines in the !nal
periods of the experiment we expect a negative coe"cient for the interaction term
"SCR*FinalPeriods".
Table 2: Repayment Behavior in R- Treatments a
Dependant Variable: Prob. of Repayment
R-CR .642*** (.074)
CreditSize  .028*** (.008)
R-CR *CreditSize .03 **   (.012)
RepaymenSize -.024*** (.006)
R-CR *RepaymentSize -.023** (.01) 
FinalPeriods -.058     (.589)
R-CR*FinalPeriods -.383*** (.115)
N = 1067
Wald (7) = 297.71
Prob = .000
Pseudo R2 =.32
a Probit regression with clustering per session. Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimators of 
marginal effect of an increase of explanatory variables on probability to repay.  *** indicates 
significance at the 1-percent level, **at the 5-percent level and * at the 10-percent level.
The results presented in Table 2 suggests that repayment rates are higher in the
R-CR treatment ceteris paribus.5 Our main explanatory variable "R-CR" is signif-
icantly positive. The table reports maximum likelihood estimators of the marginal
e!ect of each explanatory variable. The coe"cient on "R-CR" thus suggests that
the probability of a loan being repaid in the R-CR treatment was 64% higher than
in the R-NO treatment. The interaction term "R-CR*FinalPeriods" shows that
this margin was signi!cantly lower in the !nal periods of the experiment, con!rm-
ing that reputational e!ects were weaker towards the end of the experiment. As
expected larger loans and lower repayments lead to higher repayment even in the
R-NO treatment. The positive coe"cient on "CreditSize" and negative coe"cient
on "RepaymentSize" suggest that honest borrowers also considered the generosity
5Since observations within sessions may be dependent we report for all regressions in this paper
robust standard errors with clustering on sessions.
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of an o!er when making their repayment choice in this treatment. More impor-
tant, the incentive e!ects of high loans and low repayments are stronger in the
R-CR treatment. The positive coe"cient of "R-CR*CreditSize" and the negative
coe"cient "R-CR*RepaymentSize" con!rm our predictions that favourable con-
tract terms have a positive impact on loan repayment by sel!sh borrowers in the
R-CR treatment. Table 2 thus con!rms that a credit registry can motivate sel!sh
borrowers to repay loans, which they would otherwise default upon.
If lenders anticipate the disciplining e!ect of the credit registry in the R-CR
treatment we expect them to extend a higher volume of credit than they do in the
R-NO treatment. Figure 2 shows that this is the case. Market performance in our
experiment is determined uniquely by the total credit volume. As the maximum
loan size was 50 units and 7 loans were possible in each period the maximum credit
volume per period in a session was 350 units. The !gure displays the realised credit
volume per period as a percentage of this maximum credit volume accross sessions
for the R-CR and R-NO treatments.
Figure 2: Credit Volume in R-Treatments
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In the R-CR treatment almost the maximum number of loans are made from
period 1 through to period 18. The average credit size was also constantly high
in this treatment with mean credit size rising from an initial level of 34 to over 45
in period 13. As a consequence the total volume of credit rises from 64 percent
in period 1 to 92% in period 12 and remains above 80% until period 17. Not
surprisingly credit volume then falls in the !nal periods of the R-CR treatment.
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We saw in Figure 1 that the repayment rate of borrowers declines towards the end
of the experiment in this treatment. Figure 2 shows that this is anticipated by
lenders who extend lower credit volumes.
Figure 2 shows a completely di!erent picture for the R-NO treatment. Surpris-
ingly, this treatment also starts o! with a substantial credit volume. In period 1 of
the R-NO treatment 7 loans were made in all sessions at an average loan size of 31.
However, the number and size of loans falls rapidly in the R-NO treatment. From
period 11 onwards less than 4 trades are made on average per period and this falls
to less than 2 credits in the !nal periods. In addition, the mean credit size is lower
than 20 from period 9 onwards. As a consequence Figure 2 shows that total credit
volume falls steadily in the R-NO treatment and is less than 20% from period 13
onwards.
A one-sided Mann-Whitney test using total credit volume per session as obser-
vations con!rms that market performance is signi!cantly higher in the R-CR than
in the R-NO treatment "% ( ()).$. In the R-NO treatment the !ve sessions display
a credit volume (measured in percentage of the total potential volume) of 36, 29,
29, 24 and 16 percent respectively. In the R-CR treatment the credit volume per
session was 84, 81, 78, 76 and 66 percent respectively. On aggregate lenders in the
R-CR treatment extended 77% of potential credit, while in the R-NO treatment
aggregate credit was only 27% of its potential volume. Thus market performance
was nearly three times higher in the R-CR than in the R-NO treatment.
Our results so far suggest that in the R-CR treatment, where credit volume
and repayment rate are high, borrowers must bene!t from repaying loans, while
lenders are at least as well o! from making loans as they would be from not doing
so. In contrast, in the R-NO treatment, where the credit volume and repayment
rate collapse, we should see that borrowers do not bene!t at all from repaying loans
while lenders who extend credit actually make losses. Table 3 analyzes the bene!ts
of extending credit and repaying loans in both treatments. Columns 1 and 2 of the
table report a regression analysis of lenders pro!ts per period. We expect that in
the R-NO treatment those lenders who make high loans earn less than those who
make small loans or no loans at all. In contrast, we expect that those lenders who
make higher loans in the R-CR treatment yield at least as high pro!ts as those who
extend no or little credit. Due to competition for borrowers, however, we do not
expect signi!cant positive pro!ts of any lender. Our main explanatory variable in
this regression is the size of credit extended in a period. We control for time e!ects
by including the variable "FinalPeriods" which is 1 for periods 16 through 20 and 0
otherwise. The results in column (1) and (2) meet our expectations. In the R-CR
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treatment lenders who extended large loans make at least as high pro!ts as those
who make small loans. In column (1) the coe"cient of "CreditSize" is positive,
but as predicted not signi!cant. The constant term implies that in this treatment
lenders earn just their outside option of 50 irrespective of the credit volume they
extend. In the R-NO treatment the signi!cantly negative coe"cient of "CreditSize"
and the constant of 50.1 show that lenders who make high loans end up earning
less than their outside option. The regression analyses in columns (1) and (2) thus
shows that the presence of a credit registry in the R-CR treatment makes it (just)
pro!table to lend while in the R-NO treatment lenders can only make losses. This
explains our !nding that the credit market is sustained in the presence of a credit
registry while it collapses otherwise.
Table 3: Bene!ts of Lending and Repaying in R- Treatments
Dependant Variable:
Treatment (1) R-CR (2) R-NO (3) R-CR (4) R-NO
CreditSize .011    (.037) -.651*** (.069)
 RepaymentChoice 10.23*** (1.19) 1.99     (2.25)
FinalPeriods -7.51*** (.973) -.024    (.722) -8.57*** (1.50) -8.31*** (1.65)
Constant 52.19*** (.413) 50.1*** (.353) 32.76*** (2.19) 15.14*** (1.36)
N = 1000 N = 1000 N = 644 N = 403
F (2,4) = 29.82 F (2,4) = 48.17 F (2,4) = 205.39 F (2,4) = 106.26
Prob = .004 Prob = .002 Prob = .000 Prob = .000
R2 =.04 R2 =.48 R2 =.19 R2 =.04
Lenders Profits Borrowers Next Period Credit
a Linear regression with clustering per session.  *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent 
level, and * at the 10%-percent level respectively.
Table 3 also analyzes the bene!ts to borrowers from repaying loans in the R-
CR and R-NO treatments. Columns (3) and (4) of the table present a regression
analysis of the impact of repayment behavior on the future credit access of a bor-
rower. Our dependent variable is the loan received by a borrower in period ,. Our
main explanatory variable "RepaymentChoice" is a dummy variable which is * if
the borrower repaid his loan in the prior period , ! * and ) otherwise. Note that
"RepaymentChoice" does not capture the full reputation of borrower, nor does our
dependant variable capture the full future rent of a good versus a bad reputation.
We predict though that even with our simple measure of a borrowers rents the
variable "RepaymentChoice" yields a positive coe"cient. In contrast, in the R-NO
treatment the coe"cient of "RepaymentChoice" should be insigni!cant. Again we
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control for time e!ects by including the dummy variable "FinalPeriods". Column
(3) shows that in the R-CR treatment borrowers who repaid loans were rewarded
with substantially higher credit in the next period. The coe"cient of "Repay-
mentChoice" is positive and signi!cant in column (3). Apparently the credit reg-
istry in the R-CR treatment allowed lenders to identify borrowers with good track
records and to extend large loans to these trustworthy clients. In contrast, column
(4) shows that borrowers who repaid loans in the R-NO treatment did not receive
higher future loans than those borrowers who defaulted. This is by no means sur-
prising given that borrower identities were changed randomly in each period. As a
consequence, there was no incentive at all in the R-NO treatment for sel!sh bor-
rowers to repay loans.
Our results in this section suggest that a credit registry can greatly enhance the
performance of a credit market which is dominated by one-o! transactions. The
exchange of information between lenders generates incentives for borrowers to repay
loans which they would otherwise default upon. This makes it pro!table for lenders
to extend high credit volumes, despite the fact that repayment is not third-party
enforceable.
4.2 Results for the F- Treatments
In this section we examine the impact of a credit registry in a market where bank-
ing relationships can emerge by comparing market outcomes between the F-CR and
F-NO treatments. We begin again by comparing the repayment behavior of bor-
rowers between treatments. Our predictions suggest that in both treatments sel!sh
borrowers will repay loans (in non-!nal periods) out of reputational concerns. In
the F-CR treatment sel!sh borrowers can build a public reputation for being honest
because their behavior is communicated to all lenders through the credit registry.
In the F-NO treatment borrowers cannot build a public reputation for themselves
as there is no credit registry. However, by repaying loans the borrower can build a
reputation with a particular lender. Our predictions showed that a credit registry
can lead to stronger reputational incentives than a potential relationship with one
lender. Thus while we expect repayment levels to be high in the F-NO treatment,
we predict that the credit registry in the F-CR may lead to even higher repayment
rates.
Figure 3 shows that repayment behavior of borrowers is very similar in the
two treatments. In the !rst four periods repayment rates are slightly higher in
the F-CR treatment than in the F-NO. This suggests that reputational incentives
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are more obvious in a market where a credit registry is present. However, from
period 5 onwards repayment rates are identical in both treatments, hovering around
80% up until period 17. As predicted repayment rates fall towards the end of
the experiment in both treatments. In period 19 and 20 repayment rates in both
treatments are roughly 50%. This result suggests again that high levels of repayment
in earlier periods are due to strategic behavior of sel!sh borrowers rather than an
overwhelming presence of honest borrowers.
Figure 3: Repayment Rates in F- Treatments
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The aggregate repayment rate in the F-CR treatment (79%) is slightly higher
than that of the F-NO treatment (74%). However, a comparison of repayment rates
per session shows that repayment behavior does not di!er signi!cantly between the
treatments. In the !ve sessions of the F-CR treatment repayment rates are 86,
82, 78, 76 and 72 percent respectively. In comparison the !ve F-NO sessions have
repayment rates of 79, 77, 76, 72 and 68 percent respectively. A one-sided Mann-
Whitney test using these session averages as observations suggests that repayment
is not more frequent in the F-CR than it is in the F-NO treatment "% ( (**$.
In contrast to our predictions Figure 3 shows that a credit registry does not
increase repayment rates sign!cantly in a market where repeat transactions are
possible. This result suggests that credit relationships alone provide a su"cient
disciplinary mechanism in such a market. As a consequence we should also see
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that the credit volume extended by lenders does not depend on the existence of a
credit registry. Figure 4 con!rms that this is the case. The !gure displays the total
credit volume extended in the F-CR and F-NO treatments by period (again as a
percentage of the maximum volume). The !gure shows that the high repayment
rates encourage lenders to disburse large volumes of credit in both treatments. On
aggregate, 94% of potential loans are made in the F-CR treatment and 91.6% in
the F-NO treatment. Moreover, the average size of these loans is very high in
both treatments. From an initial level of 35 average loan size climbs to above 40
during the !rst ten periods and then remains between 40 and 45 for the rest of the
experiment. As a consequence total credit volume rises to more than 80% in both
treatments. Not surprisingly both treatments display a fall in credit volume in the
!nal periods. Again lenders anticipate the wearing o! of reputational incentives for
sel!sh borrowers and decrease their lending activities.
Aggregate market performance is slightly higher in the F-CR (79%) than in the
F-NO (74%) treatment. However, a one-sided Mann-Whitney using session totals
as observations !nds that this di!erence is only of weak signi!cance "% ( ()/&$. In
the !ve sessions of the F-CR treatment credit volume was 82, 82, 80, 76 and 76
percent of their potential credit volumes respectively. In comparison the !ve F-NO
sessions yielded 81, 78, 72, 69 and 69 percent respectively.
Figure 4: Credit Volume in F- Treatments
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Table 4 examines the pro!tability of extending credit and repaying loans in the
F-CR and F-NO treatments. Columns (1) and (2) analyze the impact of a borrowers
repayment decision, measured by the dummy variable "RepaymentChoice" on his
next period loan, our explanatory variable. Table 4 shows that in the F-CR treat-
ment borrowers who repay loans receive signi!cantly higher future loans than those
borrowers who default. The coe"cient of the dummy variable "RepaymentChoice"
in column (1) is strongly positive and signi!cant. The table also shows that good
borrowers are rewarded with equally high bene!ts in the F-NO treatment. The co-
e"cient of "RepaymentChoice" is equally high in column (2) and also signi!cantly
positive.
Table 4: Bene!ts of Lending and Repaying - Relational Market
Dependant Variable:
Treatment (1) F-CR (2) F-NO (3) F-CR (4) F-NO
CreditSize -.012    (.008) -.017    (.032)
 RepaymentChoice  13.33*** (1.22) 12.82**  (3.32)
FinalPeriods -5.69*   (2.65) -2.82** (1.89) -2.97*   (1.29) -4.14    (2.22)
Constant 31.02*** (1.23) 29.24*** (3.15) 49.57*** (.707) 51.38*** (.826)
N = 646 N = 626 N = 1000 N = 1000
F (2,4) = 62.89 F (2,4) = 13.06 F (2,4) = 2 F (2,4) = 2.66
Prob = .000 Prob = .018 Prob = .25 Prob = .18
R2 =.21 R2 =.16 R2 =.01 R2 =.01
Borrowers Next Period Credit Lenders Profits
a Linear regression with clustering per session.  *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent 
level, and * at the 10%-percent level respectively.
Table 4 also con!rms that it is pro!table for lenders to extend credit in both
treatments. Columns (3) and (4) of the table present a regression analysis of a
lenders credit size per period, "CreditSize", on his period pro!ts. Columns (3) and
(4) both display constants of roughly 50 and insigni!cant coe"cients for "Credit-
Size". This result suggests that in both treatments lenders who made large loans
were neither better nor worse o! than lenders who made small or no loans. This
con!rms our prediction that competition for borrowers should leave lenders who
extend credit with zero net pro!ts.
Table 4 suggests that in a market with repeat transaction reputational incentives
for borrowers do not depend on the presence of a credit registry. Our conjecture is
that in a market wothout a credit registry borrowers and lenders establish credit
relationships and that quasi-rents in these relationships motivate loan repayment.
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We should therefore !nd that credit relationships dominate market interaction in
the F-NO treatment. As Table 5 shows, this is indeed the case. The table reports
the share of renewed loans, i.e. the share of credit transactions which involved the
same lender - borrower pair as in the previous period, in the F-NO (and the F-CR)
treatment. Note that if borrowers randomly chose which lender to borrow from
the share of renewed loans in our experiment should be very minimal. Indeed, the
chance that no loan is renewed at all is 89%6. Table 5 shows that credit renewals in
the F-NO treatment were much more frequent. In that treatment the share of credit
renewals climbs from just below 40% in the initial periods to over 50% in period 11
through 20. Aggregated over all periods the share of renewed credit in the F-NO
treatment is 48%. Thus roughly half of all loans made in this treatment involve
the same lender and borrower as in the previous period. This result con!rms our
prediction that market interaction will be pervaded by credit relationships in the
absence of a credit registry, as such relations are the only means of enforcing loan
repayment.
Table 5: Share of Renewed Loans
2 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 15 16 - 20 Total
F-NO 0.38 0.44 0.58 0.50 0.48
F-CR 0.24 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.39
Periods
Surprisingly, Table 5 shows that credit relationships are also very common even
when a credit registry is present. In the F-CR treatment the share of credit renewals
is initially less than 25%, but rises steadily over the course of the experiment, also
exceeding 50% in the !nal phase of the experiment. Aggregated over all periods
the share of renewed credit in the F-CR treatment is lower than that in the F-NO
at 39%. However, due to a strong variation accross sessions a comparison of session
aggregates indicates that this di!erence is not signi!cant. In the !ve sessions of
the F-NO average renewal rates are 53, 53, 52, 36 and 34 percent respectively.
In comparison the !ve F-CR sessions have renewal rates of 52, 41, 40, 30 and 21
percent respectively. A one-sided Mann-Whitney test using these session averages
as observations suggests that credit relationships are not more frequent in the F-NO
than in the F-CR treatment "% ( (*&$.
6Suppose that the one after another the 7 borrowers could randomly choose which of 10 lenders
to deal with. The probability of only 1 loan being renewed is then 110 , that of 2 loans being renewed
is 110 · 19 etc.
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The data presented in Table 5 is quite astonishing. Although lenders have access
to a credit registry in the F-CR treatment it seems that they still rely strongly on
credit relationships to motivate loan repayment. This !nding is less surprising when
we consider the information available within a relationship to that available from a
credit registry. Within a long term relationship lenders typically have much more
information about a borrower than they could elicit from a credit report. In our
experiment this was also the case. Our credit registry only provided information on
whether a borrower repaid a loan or not. Within a relationship, however, the lender
had additional information on contract terms (credit size, repayment size) which a
lender had accepted and repaid. Table 5 suggests that this additional information
encouraged lenders to maintain relationships with a particular borrower, although
they could easily obtain the credit record of each borrower at no cost.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we applied experimental methods to examine the impact of a public
credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers in a competitive credit mar-
ket. Our results suggest that the impact of a credit registry depends strongly on
the nature of a credit market. Credit registries are highly valuable in markets which
are dominated by one-o! transactions, for example due to highly mobile borrowers.
In such markets banking relationships cannot emerge and the credit market may
collapse without the existence of an information sharing mechanism. In contrast, in
markets dominated by repeat transactions relationship banking may already solve
major information problems, so that a credit registry o!ers little added value.
Our results point to important consequences for policy makers in developing
(and developed) countries. They suggest that policy makers should concentrate on
establishing or encouraging credit registries which cover market segments dominated
by one-o! transactions, such as occasional trade credit. In other market segments,
such as working capital credit, relationship banking may already be solving the
informational problems to be targeted by a credit registry.
Our methodology and results suggest several avenues of future research. First,
experimental methods could be applied to study the endogenous emergence of in-
formation sharing. Theoretical models (Klein, 1992; Japelli and Pagano, 1993)
suggest that private credit bureaus are more likely to emerge when they are most
valuable to lenders. Experimental methods would allow to examine this hypothesis
by studying the emergence of credit bureaus under a variety of market environ-
ments. Experimental methods could also be applied to study alternative designs
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of credit bureaus and credit registries. As suggested by theoretical work (Padilla
and Pagano, 2000; Vercammen, 1995) the type of information recorded by a credit
registry, the history of credit records provided but also the incentive mechanisms
related to providing and retrieving information, may a!ect the functioning and im-
pact of a credit registry. These e!ects could be studied in a controlled manner
through carefully designed experiments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Model and Assumptions
There are 0 lenders and 1 * 0 borrowers in a game which lasts for 2 ' * peri-
ods. In each period , each lender has !! units of capital to lend. Capital has an
opportunity cost of * (repayment plus interest) per unit. The lender can lend any
part of this capital !" %
£
)) !!
¤
in each period to any one borrower. In order to do
so, the !rst stage of each period is such that all lenders can simultaneously submit
a credit o!er to any subset of borrowers7. A credit o!er ,!") #""+ consists of a loan
size !" and a desired repayment #"" (principal plus interest). At the second stage of
each period borrowers choose in random order from the available o!ers. In each
period borrowers are free to accept one of the available loans or not to borrow at all.
The repayment of a loan cannot be enforced by the lender. At stage three of each
period the borrower can choose to either make the requested repayment "" ( #"" or
not repay at all "" ( ) (gradual repayments are not possible).
The period payo! of a lender #" is calculated as follows:
#" ( !! ! !" ' ""
Each borrower has a !xed return 3 from self-!nanced projects in each period.
Additionally, the borrower can invest any capital !" borrowed in a safe project which
yields a safe return of 4"!"$ ( 5!", whereby 5 ' *.
The period payo! of a borrower $" is therefore given by:
$""!") "") #""$ ( 3' 4"!"$! ""
There are 2 types of borrowers: A share % are honest types who su!er mental
costs 6"#"") !"$ (bad conscience / inequity aversion) if they don’t repay in cases where
they perceive the !nancing conditions as "fair" (i.e., in cases where the desired
repayment does not exceed a certain reference value ""), the rest of the borrowers
are purely sel!sh pro!t-maximizers:
6"#"") !"$
honest (
½ & if "" * #"" and #"" # !" "!"$
) if "" $ #"" or #"" ' !" "!"$
6"#"") !"$
sel!sh ( )
Thus, the period utility of borrower can be written as:
7""!") "") #""$ ( $" ! 6"#"") !"$
As a consequence honest borrowers always repay their loans as long as they have
received "fair" !nancing conditions in a given period.
The total material surplus per trade is given by
#""!") ""$! !! ' 7""!") "") #""$! 3 ( 4"!"$! !" ( "5! *$ !"
With respect to the reference repayment of honest borrowers, we assume that
!""!$ ( &!, whereby & % "*) "5 ' *$+%+. This means that the reference repayment
7Since continuous auctions have de!ed a fully rigorous analysis so far we make this assumption
on the trading mechanism for tractability reasons
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is somewhere in between the repayment where all the gains from trade go to the
borrower and the repayment where the gains from trade are equally split between
lender and borrower.
Since we assume that 5 ' * it is value maximizing if the maximum credit volume
!! is provided in each transaction period.
A.2 Lending with Random Identi!cation Numbers
In each period all market participants receive freshly assigned identi!cation num-
bers. Lenders therefore cannot recognize any of the borrowers, even if they have
!nanced them before.
A.2.1 Market without Credit Registry
Lenders do not receive any information on the prior behavior of any borrower in
the market. Each period , can therefore be viewed as a one-period game. In
the following we consequently drop the time index , and analyze the one-period
outcome.
Proposition A1: If % $ 1
!
there exists a perfect bayesian equilibrium in which all
borrowers receive maximum credit !!. If % * 1
!
no credit is extended in equilibrium
Proof of Proposition A1: Lenders anticipate that honest borrowers will always
repay a loan ! only if #" "!$ # !""!$, while sel!sh borrowers will never repay a loan.
The expected pro!t of a lender is thus:
8# "!) "$ (
½
!! ! ! ' %"!"!$ if #"!"!$ # !" "!$
!! ! ! if #"!"!$ ' !" "!$
Thus only if there exists a ! ' ) for which %!" "!$ ' ! will any lender o!er any
credit. As !""!$ ( &! this requires that % $ 1
!
.
If condition ,0+ is ful!lled lenders can pro!tably o!er credit ! ' ) at a rate
#"!"!$ # !" "!$ to borrowers. Due to competition among lenders these will earn zero
pro!ts so that %"!"!$ ( !( Honest borrowers thus earn 7"!!) "!$ ( 3' 5!! "!"!$ (
3 ' "5 ! 1
#
$!!. Borrowers prefer the highest possible credit level as our parameter
assumptions imply 5% ' *. We have therefore established that in a one-period game
the equilibrium contract o!er of lenders will be
,!!) "!+ (
( h
!!) $¯
#
i
if % $ 1
!
,)) )+ if % * 1
!
This concludes our proof of Proposition 1.
2
A.2.2 Market with Credit Registry
Lenders are exogenously forced (legal obligation) to submit information on their
previous lending to a public credit registry. In return they receive a credit report
which states which borrowers repaid their loans and which borrowers defaulted
in each period. The provision of information and access to the credit registry
information has no cost for lenders.
Proposition 2 shows that even if the share of honest borrowers would lead to
a market collapse in a one-shot transaction (i.e., if % * 1
!
then in equilibrium no
credit is issued (Proposition 1)), a public credit registry can sustain a considerable
credit provision. In this equilibrium sel!sh borrowers partly default in some initial
periods generating valuable information for lender. Since % * 1
!
sel!sh borrowers
must do something to ensure that lenders strongly enough believe in the honesty
of repaying borrowers in order to o!er credit in periods where the end of the game
draws near.
Proposition A2: Consider a game of 2 $ % periods and suppose that % * 1
!
.
With exogenous credit reporting The following strategies and beliefs form a perfect
bayesian equilibrium.
• In all periods , * 2 ! - all lenders o!er the contract ,!!" ) "!" + (
£
!!) !!
¤
to all
borrowers who always repaid in the past. No lender o!ers any credit to a
borrower who defaulted in any previous period 9 * ,(
• In period 2 ! - all lenders o!er the contract ,!!" ) "!" + (
£
!!) !""!!$
¤
only to those
borrowers who always repaid in the past. No lender o!ers any credit to a
borrower who defaulted in any previous period 9 * 2 ! -(
• In all periods 2 ! - * , # 2 all lenders o!er the contract ,!!" ) "!" + (
£
!!) !""!!$
¤
with probability .!" (
!
%
only to those borrowers who have a clean record. No
lender o!ers any credit to a borrower who defaulted in any previous period
9 * ,(
• Honest borrowers accept the contract ,!!" ) "!" + in all periods , and repay the
loan in each period.
• Sel!sh borrowers accept the contract ,!!" ) "!" + in all periods ,. Their repayment
probability /!" is given by
/!" (
!""#""$
* if , * 2 ! -
(!!"1)#
1"# if , ( 2 ! -
!!!""1
!!+1!""1 if , ( 2 ! -' : for all : % {*) %) ((() -! *}
) if , ( 2
• All lenders believe that any borrower who defaults on a loan in periods , *
2 ! - is sel!sh.
Proof of Proposition A2: Proof is by construction and is established in 4 steps:
Step 1 (repayment by honest borrowers): Honest borrowers will repay in each
period as long as their !nancing conditions are fair; i.e. #"!" # !""!!$ ( &!!.
Given the strategies of lenders this condition is satis!ed in every period.
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Step 2 (repayment by sel!sh borrowers): In period 2 sel!sh borrowers will always
default. In non-!nal periods , * 2 sel!sh borrowers will repay with a positive
probability if their following incentive constraint is met:!"" ' ; &"+1 $ ; '"+1,
whereby ; &"+1 and ;
'
"+1 represent the future expected utilities of a sel!sh bor-
rower at the beginning of period t+1 after repaying respectively defaulting in
period ,. We !rst consider a sel!sh borrower’s incentives in the next to last pe-
riod 2!*: Given the lenders’ strategies above we have ; &( ( 3'.!( 5!! ( 3'&!!
and ; '( ( 3. As "
!
("1 ( !""!!$ ( &!! the incentive constraint is met with equal-
ity in period 2 ! *. It is therefore a best strategy for the sel!sh borrower to
repay with any probability /!("1 % ,)) *+. Concerning the decision in 2 ! %
we have ; &("1 ( %3 ' .
!
("1,5!! ! !""!!$ ' .!( 5!!+ ( %3 ' &!! and ; '( ( %3. As
"!("2 ( !""!!$ ( &!! the incentive constraint is again met with equality in period
2 ! % and it is therefore a best strategy for the sel!sh borrower to repay with
any probability /!("2 % ,)) *+. The same argument can be made for all periods
, $ 2 ! -. In periods , * 2 ! - all lenders o!er the contract ,!!" ) "!" + (
£
!!) !!
¤
with certainty. As "!" ( !! * 5!! the incentive constraint is met with inequality
in these periods. It is therefore a best strategy for sel!sh borrowers to repay
with probability /!" ( * in all periods , * 2 ! -.
Step 3 (contracts of lenders): In each period all lenders have identical information
concerning borrowers. Competition for clients implies that lenders earn zero
pro!ts in each period. In periods , * 2!- all borrowers repay with probability
1 so that competition bids repayment demands down to !!. In all periods , $
2 !- the repayment !""!!$ ( &!! yields zero pro!ts if ,%)" ' "*! %)"$/!" + !""!!$ ( !!,
whereby %)" is the lenders’ belief at the beginning of period , about the honesty
of a borrower who repaid in all former periods. Bayesian updating implies
that this belief is calculated as %)" (
##$!1
##$!1+(1"##$!1)*"$!1 . In the !nal period
2 sel!sh borrowers default "/!( ( )$ so that lenders’ belief must be at least
%)( $ 1! in order for them to o!er a contract to borrowers (see Proposition A1).
In equilibrium sel!sh borrowers must choose their repayment probability in
period 2 !* so that this necessary belief in 2 is achieved: /!("1 # #
#
%!1(+¯($¯)"$¯)
$¯(1"##%!1)
.
Given the zero-pro!t condition for lenders (see above) this implies that at the
beginning of period 2 ! * the lenders’ belief must be at least %)("1 $ 1!2 .
Accordingly we can calculate the minimally necessary belief of lenders at the
beginning of each period 2 ! 9 for all 9 # -: %,-.("/ ( 1!&+1 . By de!nition
the period 2 ! - is the last period in which the population fraction of honest
borrowers is above the minimal belief of lenders 1
!!
$ % $ 1
!!+1
. It is therefore
in this period that borrowers start to partly default, such that the minimal
belief can be sustained in all subsequent periods. The equilibrium repayment
probabilities of borrowers in all periods , $ 2 ! 9 for ) * 9 # - are given by
solving the following equation for .!" :
##$
##$+0
"
$ (1"##$ ) ( %
,-.
"+1 , whereby %
)
("1 ( %
and %)("/ ( %
,-.
("/:
/!" (
!""#""$
* if , * 2 ! -
(!!"1)#
1"# if , ( 2 ! -
!!!""1
!!+1!""1 if , ( 2 ! -' : for all : % {*) %) ((() -! *}
) if , ( 2
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Given the repayment strategies of borrowers the zero-pro!t condition is satis-
!ed with equality in each period and therefore lenders are always indi!erent
between o!ering a credit contract and keeping their capital to themselves:
.!" % ,)) *+ for all ,.
Step 4 (beliefs of lenders): In periods , * 2 ! - lenders believe that any borrower
without a clean record is sel!sh. This is an out of equilibrium belief as in
equilibrium no borrower defaults prior to period 2 ! -. In periods , $ 2 ! -
lenders believe that any borrower who defaulted in a period is sel!sh. This is
the only rational belief as in equilibrium only sel!sh borrowers default with a
positive probability.
A.3 Lending with Fixed Identities
We now assume that borrowers have !xed ID numbers so that lenders can identify
those borrowers who they have traded with in the past.
A.3.1 Market without Credit Registry
Proposition A3 shows that even without a credit registry substantial credit vol-
umes can be sustained due to relational contracts between particular lenders and
borrowers. Sel!sh borrowers partly default in the !rst period so that the incumbent
lenders’ belief increases to the level necessary in order to make a zero-pro!t loan
in a one-shot environment. In all non-!nal subsequent periods incumbent lenders
o!er loans with such a probability that it is a (non-unique) best response for sel!sh
borrowers to repay with certainty. In the !nal period incumbent lenders o!er the
"one-shot"-zero-pro!t contract and only honest borrowers repay while all sel!sh
borrowers default.
Proposition A3: Consider a game of 2 $ % periods and suppose that % *
1
!
. Without exogenous credit reporting the following strategies and beliefs form a
perfect bayesian equilibrium.
• In period 1 all lenders o!er the contract ,!!" ) #"!1+ (
h
!!) 1
#!
!!
i
to all borrowers.
• In period 2 all lenders who concluded a contract in period 1 o!er the contract
,!!" ) #"
!
" + (
£
!!) !!
¤
to their !rst-period-borrower with probability .!" (
1
%#!
if this
borrower repaid in period 1. If the incumbent borrower of a lender defaulted
in a period 1 or if the lender didn’t conclude a contract in the !rst period,
the lender does not o!er any credit at all.
• In all periods - # , * 2 all lenders who concluded a contract in the last
period o!er the contract ,!!" ) #"
!
" + (
£
!!) !!
¤
to their !rst-period-borrower with
probability .!" (
1
%
if this borrower repaid in all past periods. If the incumbent
borrower of a lender defaulted in a past period or if the lender didn’t conclude
a contract in the !rst period, the lender does not o!er any credit at all.
• In period 2 all lenders who concluded a contract in period 2 ! * o!er the
contract ,!!" ) #"
!
" + (
£
!!) &!!
¤
to their !rst-period-borrower with probability .!" (
1
%
if this borrower repaid in all past periods. If the incumbent borrower of a
lender defaulted in a past period or if the lender didn’t conclude a contract
in the !rst period, the lender does not o!er any credit at all.
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• Honest borrowers accept the contract ,!!" ) "!" + in all periods , and repay the
loan in each period.
• Sel!sh borrowers accept the contract ,!!" ) "!" + in all periods ,. Their repayment
strategy is given by
/!" (
!#$
#(!"1)
1"# if , ( *
* if % # , * 2
) if , ( 2
(
• All lenders believe that any borrower who defaults on a loan in any period
% # , * 2 ! * is sel!sh. Furthermore, lenders believe that sel!sh borrowers
always default in any period % # , * 2 ! * if #"""!"$ $ !!. Finally, outside
lenders believe that if a sel!sh borrower does switch in any period , ' * he
will default and switch again in the following period.
Proof of Proposition A3: Proof is by construction and is established in 4 steps:
Step 1 (repayment by honest borrowers): Honest borrowers will repay in each
period as long as their !nancing conditions are fair; i.e. #"!" # !""!!$ ( &!!.
Given the strategies of lenders this condition is satis!ed in every period.
Step 2 (repayment by sel!sh borrowers): In period 2 sel!sh borrowers will always
default. In non-!nal periods , * 2 sel!sh borrowers will repay with a positive
probability if their following incentive constraint is met:!"" ' ; &"+1 $ ; '"+1,
whereby ; &"+1 and ;
'
"+1 represent the future expected utilities of a sel!sh
borrower at the beginning of period , ' * after repaying respectively de-
faulting in period ,. We !rst consider the a sel!sh borrower’s incentives in
the next to last period 2 ! *: Given the lenders’ strategies above we have
; &( ( 3 ' .
!
( 5
!! ( 3 ' !! and ; '( ( 3. As "
!
("1 ( !! the incentive constraint
is met with equality in period 2 ! *. It is therefore a best strategy for the
sel!sh borrower to repay with any probability /!("1 % ,)) *+. Concerning the
decision in 2 ! % we have ; &("1 ( %3 ' .!("1,5!! ! !! ' .!( 5!!+ ( %3 ' !! and
; '( ( %3. As "
!
("2 ( !! the incentive constraint is again met with equality
in period 2 ! % and it is therefore a best strategy for the sel!sh borrower to
repay with any probability /!("2 % ,)) *+. The same argument can be made
for all periods % # , # 2 ! - such that in each of these periods all feasible
repayment probabilities are optimal: /!" % ,)) *+. In period 1 the following
terms are relevant: "!1 (
1
#!
!!, ; &2 ( "2 ! *$ 3 ' .!25!! ( "2 ! *$ 3 ' 1#!!! and
; '2 ( "2 ! *$ 3. In the !rst period the incentive constraint is therefore also
met with equality and any repaying strategy /!1 % ,)) *+ is a (non-unique) best
response of a sel!sh borrower.
Step 3 (contracts of incumbent lenders): Competition among lenders implies that
in equilibrium expected pro!ts of lenders are equal to zero. In the last period
2 a lender’s belief about the honesty of a borrower must satisfy %)( $ 1! in
order for the lender to be willing to o!er a contract to this borrower (in the
last period borrowers have the same incentives as in one-shot interactions, the
condition above therefore corresponds to the condition derived in Proposition
1). The repayment strategy of borrowers described above implies that a lender
who concluded a contract in period 1 and got a positive repayment has the
following belief about the honesty of his incumbent borrower in all periods
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, $ %: %)" ( %)2 ( ##+(1"#)*"1 (
1
!
. O!ering the contract ,!!( ) "
!
( + ( ,
!!) !""!!+ with
any probability .!( % ,)) *+ in period 2 is therefore a (non-unique) optimal
choice of lenders. In all periods % # , * 2 sel!sh borrowers repay with
certainty. Therefore lenders who concluded a contract in the last period can
o!er the zero-pro!t contract ,!!" ) #"
!
" + (
£
!!) !!
¤
to their incumbent borrower.
Since lenders believe that their borrower defaults if #"""!"$ $ !! this is the
optimal o!er and because they make zero-pro!ts it is optimal to o!er the
contract with any probability .!" % ")) *$. In period 1 a borrower who gets
a contract repays with probability #(!"1)
1"# . O!ering the following zero-pro!t
contract ,!!" ) #"
!
1+ (
h
!!) 1
#!
!!
i
is therefore an (non-unique) optimal choice for all
lenders in period 1.
Step 4 (contracts of outside lenders): Outside lenders have the (out of equilibrium)
belief that if a sel!sh borrower switches in any period , ' * he will default and
switch again in the following period. The probability for an outside lender of
being repaid is thus at most % * 1
!
. From Proposition A1 we know that it is
not pro!table for the outside lender to o!er any loan in this case.
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